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Abstract 
Assessing and managing the impact of large-scale epidemics considering only the individual risk 
and severity of the disease is exceedingly difficult and could be extremely expensive. Economic 
consequences, infrastructure and service disruption, as well as the recovery speed, are just a few of 
the many dimensions along which to quantify the effect of an epidemic on society's fabric. Here, 
we extend the concept of resilience to characterize epidemics in structured populations, by defining 
the system-wide critical functionality that combines an individual’s risk of getting the disease 
(disease attack rate) and the disruption to the system’s functionality (human mobility deterioration). 
By studying both conceptual and data-driven models, we show that the integrated consideration of 
individual risks and societal disruptions under resilience assessment framework provides an 
insightful picture of how an epidemic might impact society. In particular, containment interventions 
intended for a straightforward reduction of the risk may have net negative impact on the system by 
slowing down the recovery of basic societal functions. The presented study operationalizes the 
resilience framework, providing a more nuanced and comprehensive approach for optimizing 
containment schemes and mitigation policies in the case of epidemic outbreaks. 
 
 
  
Introduction 
Data-driven models of infectious diseases 1–15 are increasingly used to provide real- or near-real-
time situational awareness during disease outbreaks. Indeed, notwithstanding the limitations 
inherent to predictions in complex systems, mathematical and computational models have been 
used to forecast the size of epidemics 16–19, assess the risk of case importation across the world 
10,14,20, and communicate the risk associated to uncurbed epidemics outbreaks 21–23. Despite 
contrasting opinions on the use of modelling in epidemiology 24, in the last few years a large number 
of studies have employed them to evaluate disease containment and mitigation strategies as well as 
to inform contingency plans for pandemic preparedness 11,13,15,24,25. Model-based epidemic 
scenarios in most cases focus on the ``how many and for how long?'' questions. Furthermore, 
mitigation and containment policies are currently evaluated in the modelling community by the 
reduction they produce on the attack rate (number of cases) in the population. These studies aim at 
identifying best epidemic management strategies but typically neglect the epidemic and mitigation 
impact on the societal functions overall.  
The evaluation of vulnerabilities and consequences of epidemics is a highly dimensional complex 
problem that should consider societal issues such as infrastructures and services disruption, forgone 
output, inflated prices, crisis-induced fiscal deficits and poverty 26,27. Therefore, it is important to 
broaden the model-based approach to epidemic analysis, expanding the purview by including 
measures able to assess the system resilience, i.e. response of the entire system to disturbances, 
their aftermath, the outcome of mitigation as well as the system's recovery and retention of 
functionality 28–30. Most important, operationalizing resilience 29–31 must include the temporal 
dimension; i.e. a system’s recovery and retention of functionality in the face of adverse events 30,32–
35. The assessment and management of system resilience to epidemics must, therefore, identify the 
critical functionalities of the system and evaluate the temporal profile of how they are maintained 
or recover in response to adverse events. 
Even though the assessment and management of adverse events resilience of complex systems is 
the subject of active research 32,33,35,36, its integration in the computational analysis of epidemic 
threats is still largely unexplored 27,37,38.  
Here, we introduce a resilience framework to the analysis of the global spreading of an infectious 
disease in structured populations. We simulate the spread of infectious diseases across connected 
populations, and monitor the system–level response to the epidemic by introducing a definition of 
engineering resilience that compounds both the disruption caused by the restricted travel and social 
distancing, and the incidence of the disease. We find that while intervention strategies, such as 
restricting travel and encouraging self-initiated social distancing, may reduce the risk to individuals 
of contracting the disease, they also progressively degrade population mobility and reduce the 
critical functionality thus making the system less resilient. Our numerical results show a transition 
point that signals an abrupt change of the overall resilience in response to these mitigation policies. 
Consequently, containment measures that reduce risk may drive the system into a region associated 
with long-lasting overall disruption and low resilience. Interestingly, this region is in proximity of 
the global invasion threshold of the system, and it is related to the slowing down of the epidemic 
progression. Our study highlights that multiple dimensions of a socio-technical system must be 
considered in epidemic management and sets forward a new framework of potential interest in 
analyzing contingency plans at the national and international levels. 
Results 
We provide a general framework for the analysis of the system-level resilience to epidemics by 
initially considering a metapopulation network (Figure 1A).  In this case we consider a system made 
of ! distinct subpopulations. These form a network in which each subpopulation " is made of #$ 
individuals and is connected to a set %$ of other subpopulations. A complete description of the 
networked systems is given in the Methods section. The notation and the description of the 
parameters used in our simulations are reported in Table 1. 
 Figure 1. Schematic representation of the metapopulation model. The system is composed of a 
network of subpopulations or patches, connected by diffusion processes. Each patch contains a 
population of individuals who are characterized with respect to their stage of the disease (e.g. 
susceptible, exposed, susceptible with fear, infected, removed), and identified with a different color 
in the picture. Individuals can move from a subpopulation to another on the network of connections 
among subpopulations. At each time step individuals move with a commuting rate	'$( from 
subpopulation " to subpopulation ). (B) Schematic illustration of the system's critical functionality. 
The system if fully functional (*+(-) = 1) during ordinary conditions when all the subpopulations 
are healthy and the number of real commuters is equal to the number of virtual commuters, i.e. 1(-) = 0 and *(-) = 3(-). After the outbreak takes place (45) the system's functionality decreases 
because of the disease propagation and the eventual travel reduction. Next the system starts to 
recover until the complete extinction of the epidemic (46) which corresponds to the time when no 
more infected individuals are in the system. The curves (a) and (b) represent the critical 
functionality of scenarios corresponding to high and low values of resilience. 
 
Diffusion Processes. The edge connecting two subpopulations " and ) indicates the presence of a 
flux of travelers i.e. diffusion, mobility of people. We assume that individuals in the subpopulation " will visit the subpopulations ) with a per capita diffusion rate 7$( on any given edge 39 (see the 
Methods section for further details). We define the total number of travelers 3 between the 
subpopulations " and ) at time - as 3$( - = 	7$(#$(-), so that when the system is fully functional, 
the total number of travelers at time - from the node " is 3$ - = 	 3$((-)(	∈9: .  Under these 
conditions, the total number of travelers in the metapopulation system at time - is simply 3 - =	 3$(-)	$ .  
Table 1. Notation and description of the parameters used in our simulations.  
 
Notation Description ! Number of subpopulations in the metapopulation network # Number of  individuals in the system 〈%〉 Average degree of the metapopulation network 1 Number of diseased populations = Fraction of healthy populations > Fraction of active travelers in the system ? The parameter that regulates the system wide travel restrictions @ System’s resilience *+ System’s critical functionality 4A Resilience control time B Susceptible individuals BC Susceptible individuals with fear D Exposed individuals E Infected individuals F Recovered individuals F5 Basic reproduction number G	 The rate at which an ‘exposed’ person becomes ‘infected’ H The rate at which an ‘infected’ recovers and moves into the ‘recovered’ compartment I The parameter controlling how often a ‘susceptible’-‘infected’ contact results in a new ‘exposed’ IC The parameter controlling how often a ‘susceptible’-‘infected’ contact results in ‘susceptible 
individual with fear’ J The parameter controlling how often a ‘susceptible’-‘susceptible individuals with fear’ contact results 
in a new ‘susceptible individual with fear’ @K The parameter that modulates the level of self-induced behavioral change that leads to the reduction of the transmission rate HC The rate at which individual with fear moves back into the ‘susceptible’ compartment 
 
In the following we assume that infected individuals do not travel between subpopulations, thus 
reducing the actual number of travelers. 
Reaction Processes. In analyzing contagion processes we extend the compartmental scheme of the 
basic SEIR model 40,41 (see Methods and Supplementary Information (SI) for a detailed 
description). Indeed an important element in the mitigation of epidemics is self-initiated behavioral 
changes triggered in the population by awareness/fear of the disease 42,43. These generally reduce 
the transmissibility and spreading. Examples of behavioral changes include social distancing 
behaviors such as avoidance of public places, working from home, decrease of leisure and business 
travel etc. In order to include behavioral changes in our model, we consider a separate behavioral 
class within the population 44, defining a special compartment of susceptible individuals, BC, where + stands for “fearful”. In particular, individuals transition to this compartment depending on the 
prevalence of infected and other fearful individuals according to a rate	IC. This rate mimics the 
likelihood that individuals will adopt a different social behavior as a result of the increased 
awareness of the disease as perceived from the number of infected and fearful individuals present 
in the system. Clearly, spontaneous or more complex types of transitions (for example indirectly 
linked to the disease transmission due to mass media effects44) could be considered. However, they 
would require more parameters and introduce other non-trivial dynamics. We leave the study of 
other behavioral changes models for future works.  It follows that in each subpopulation the total 
number of individuals is partitioned into the compartments B - , BC - , D - , E - , F(-) denoting 
the number of susceptible, fearful, exposed, infected, and removed individuals at time -, 
respectively. The transition processes are defined by the following scheme: B	 + 	E → 	D	 + 	E, B	 +	E → 	BC + 	E, B + BC → 	2BC, BC 	+ 	E → 	D	 + 	E, D → 	E and E → 	F with their respective reaction 
rates, I, IC, J	IC, @KI, G and H. Analogously, individuals in the BC compartment may transition 
back in the susceptible compartment with a rate HC, BC + B → 	B. The model reverts to the classic 
SEIR if IC = 0 (the detailed presentation of the dynamic is reported in the SI). The basic 
reproductive number of an SEIR model is F5 	= I/H. This quantity determines the average number 
of infections generated by one infected individual in a fully susceptible population. In each 
subpopulation the disease transmission is able to generate a number of infected individuals larger 
than those who recover only if F5 > 	1, yielding the classic result for the epidemic threshold 45; if 
the spreading rate is not large enough to allow a reproductive number larger than one (i.e., I > H), 
the epidemic outbreak will affect only a negligible portion of the population and will quickly die 
out (the model details are reported in the Methods section). 
System’s resilience. Here, we introduce a quantitative measure that captures and implements the 
definition of resilience in epidemic modelling, similarly to what proposed in Ganin et al.32,34. 
Among the many possible elements defining the resilience of a system, we consider the system-
wide critical functionality as a function of the individual’s risk of getting the disease and the 
disruption to the system’s functionality generated by the human mobility deterioration. For the sake 
of simplicity, in our model we assume that infected individuals do not travel.  The extension to 
models in which a fraction of infected individuals are traveling is straightforward4 with the only 
effect of decreasing the timescale for the disease spreading, but not altering the overall dynamic of 
the system. Furthermore, as discussed below, the system might be subject to other travel limitations. 
As a result, during the epidemic we have an overall decrease in the mobility flows with respect to 
a disease-free scenario. It follows that the number of travelers between subpopulations " and ) at 
time - is *$(	 - = '$(	#$	 - , where '$( is the adjusted diffusion rate, #$	 - = B$ - + D$	 - +F$	 - , and the total number of commuters in the metapopulation system at time t is given by * - =∑*$	 - . Note that in general, '$( < 7$(. This can be naturally related to a deterioration of the 
system-level critical functionality as it corresponds to economic and financial losses as well as 
logistic and infrastructural service disruption. In order to evaluate the system's loss of critical 
functionality related to the travel restrictions, we define the fraction of active travelers at time - as >(-) = *(-)/3(-).	Analogously, we characterize the system's risk related to the disease 
propagation as the fraction of healthy subpopulations =(-) = 1 − 1(-)/!, where 1(-) is the 
number of diseased subpopulations at time - and !	is the total number of subpopulations in the 
system. The number of diseased subpopulations accounts for the amount of risk posed to individuals 
in the system, which we assume to be proportional to the overall attack rate and expresses the 
vulnerability of the networked system 36,46,47. Here, as the model assumes statistically equivalent 
subpopulations, the attack rate is proportional to the number of subpopulations affected by the 
epidemic. At time -, we define the critical functionality, *+(-), (Figure 1B), as the product of the 
fraction of active travelers >(-) and the fraction of healthy populations =(-), i.e. *+ - = = - ⋅
	>(-). Per our earlier definition of resilience 32 @, we evaluate it as the integral over time of the 
critical functionality, normalized over the control time 4W  so that @ ∈ [0,1]: 
 @ = 14W 	 *+ - 7-Z[5 	.	 (1) 
 
The control time 4W  corresponds to the maximum extinction time 46 for different values of epidemic 
reproductive number F5 (see the Supporting Information for further detail). Resilience, therefore, 
also includes the time dimension, in particular, the time to return to full functionality, as defined by 
the system's critical elements.  In reference32 we provided an operational definition of resilience 
starting from the concepts advanced by the National Academy of Sciences in USA. In this paper, 
we apply such general framework to the case of disease spreading. Furthermore, we extend it to 
reaction-diffusion processes on metapopulations. In the following, we will quantitatively 
characterize different containment/mitigation interventions via a critical functionality analysis. 
Desirable (optimal) strategies correspond to high (maximum) value of @. It is worth remarking that, 
for the sake of simplicity, we use here a definition of critical functionality that weights equally the 
two components >(-) and =(-). Thus, our findings are constrained by such choice. The two 
contributions could be weighted differently, i.e. *+ - = = - \ ⋅ 	> - ]. However, our aim is to 
highlight the importance of going beyond “model-based” approach to epidemic analysis and move 
towards system resilience assessments. In this spirit, we opted for the simplest definition of critical 
functionality able to capture the two most used metrics in model-based approaches: epidemic risk 
and mobility. We used the multiplication of the two quantities because it makes the critical 
functionality more sensitive to small changes of the values. Furthermore, by multiplying two ratios 
we don’t need to add a normalization factor (the critical functionality is defined in the interval 
[0,1]). In more realistic context, and depending on the precise cost-benefit analysis, the various 
terms may be weighted differently and more complex functional form for the critical functionality 
can be defined.  
Figure 2. Resilience and final fraction of diseased populations in the heterogeneous 
metapopulation system with traffic dependent diffusion rates. (A) 3D surface representing 
resilience in a homogeneous metapopulation system as a function of local threshold F5	and the 
diffusion rate ?: the minimum value of resilience separates two regions associated to values very 
close to the optimal case. (B) Cross-sections (blue) of the 3D plot for F5 = 3.5 and its comparison 
with the final fraction of diseased populations (red): while the reduction of the diffusion rate ? 
brings to a constant the fraction of diseased populations it also causes an initial decrease of 
resilience to a minimum value after which it starts increasing and the system returns to its optimal 
conditions. (C) The map of the final fraction of diseased populations 1`	/	! is shown as a function 
of the local epidemic threshold F5 and the travel diffusion ?. We show that the minimum values of 
resilience (blue points) correspond to the theoretical value of the final fraction of diseased 
subpopulations 1`/	! at the end of the global epidemic (black line). 
 
Among other things, these type of analysis could consider: i) the details of the disease spreading in 
the population such as mortality, infectiousness, recovery time, and possible residual immunity ii) 
the preparedness, measured in terms of availability of vaccines, anti-virals, hospital beds, or 
intensive care units, iii) the socio-economical costs induced by a major outbreak and by 
interventions such as travel bans, school closures etc. iv) politics and public perception of risk.  
Effects of system-wide travel restrictions. Epidemic containment measures, based on limiting or 
constraining human mobility, are often considered in the contingency planning and always re-
emerge when there are new infectious disease threats 1. The target of these control measures are 
travels to/from the areas affected by an epidemic outbreak and the corresponding decrease of 
infected individuals reaching areas not yet affected by the epidemic. At the same time, travel 
restrictions have a large impact on the economy and affect the delivery of services, including 
medical supplies and the deployment of specialized personnel to manage the epidemic. For this 
reason, travel restrictions must be carefully scrutinized to trade off the costs and benefits. We 
introduce the parameter ? ∈ 	 [10ab, 1] that allows us to simulate policy-induced system-wide travel 
restrictions. In our settings, such measures are active until the disease is circulating in the system, 
i.e. there is at least one infected individual across all subpopulations.  In the case of no travel 
restrictions and/or after the disease dies out, we have ? = 1. In the case of travel restrictions (? <1), we rescale travel flow so that mobility is a fraction of that in the unaffected system; i.e. '$( =? ⋅ 	7$(. To better understand the effect of such mitigation strategy, let us consider the classic SEIR 
model by setting IC = 0. In the presence of travel restrictions and depending on the level of mixing, 
each subpopulation may or may not transmit the infection or contagion process to another 
subpopulation it is in contact with. In other words, the mobility parameter ? influences the 
probability that exposed individuals will export the contagion process to other regions of the 
metapopulation network. Further, it introduces a transition between a regime in which the contagion 
process may invade a macroscopic fraction of the network and a regime in which it is limited to a 
few subpopulations. The transition is mathematically characterized by the global invasion threshold F∗ 45. This is the analogue of the basic reproductive number at the subpopulations level and defines 
the average number of infected subpopulations generated by one infected subpopulation in a fully 
susceptible metapopulation system. In general, F∗ is a function of the basic epidemic parameters, 
including F5, and the mobility parameter ?. The invasion threshold occurs at the critical value ?A 
for which F∗ = 1. In some cases, ?A can be evaluated analytically (see the Methods section). In 
general, it can be estimated numerically by measuring the number of infected subpopulations as a 
function of the parameter ?.  Risk, as measured in terms of attack rate, is, therefore, monotonically 
decreasing due to increasingly restricted travel, and falls to virtually zero for values of ? below the 
invasion threshold. Thus, from a risk perspective, the best strategy during a disease outbreak is to 
reduce the mobility. However, an inspection of the profile of resilience provides a different picture. 
In Figure 2 we report the value of @ obtained by sampling the phase space of the model ? − F5 for 
different values of the travel diffusion parameter and the epidemic reproductive number in 
heterogeneous metapopulation systems (a comparison between homogenous and heterogeneous 
networks is reported in SI). Each point of the phase space is studied by performing 100 stochastic 
realizations. The 3D dimensional plot in the ?, F5, @ space reported in Figure 2A indicates that the 
overall resilience profile is characterized by a sharp drop as we approach the invasion threshold, 
i.e. ? → 	?A. Figure 2B shows that, while the risk decreases, the reduction of the diffusion rate ? 
causes a reduction of @ until the global invasion threshold, after which the resilience value rapidly 
increases. This effect is mainly due to the critical slowing of the epidemic spreading near the 
invasion threshold. Indeed, close to the threshold, the epidemic is still in a supercritical state, but it 
takes increasingly longer time to invade the system as the threshold is approached. This can be 
simply related to the divergence of the invasion doubling time 4d, which is defined as the time until 
the number of infected subpopulations doubles, relative to that at some other time. The doubling 
time is related to the subpopulation reproductive number as 4d~ F∗ 	− 	1 af	, leading to a 
divergence of the doubling time as the invasion threshold is approached for F∗ → 	1. Although the 
absolute risk is very low, the system remains in a state of deteriorated functionality (restrictions in 
travels) for longer and longer times 48. The decrease of functionality is not offset by a corresponding 
decrease of risk, and the minimum in resilience is attained exactly at the global invasion threshold. 
The comparison between the theoretical values of the invasion threshold and the computed 
minimum values of resilience is reported in Figure 2C.  
 
 Figure 3. Resilience and diseased populations in a heterogeneous metapopulation system with 
individual self-dependent travel reduction. (A) 3D surface representing resilience in a 
heterogeneous metapopulation system as a function of local threshold F5 and the fear parameter IC: two areas of high values of resilience are separated with a narrow region of very low ones. (B) 
Comparison between resilience (blue) reported as cross-sections of the 3D plot for F5 = 1.3 and 
the final fraction of diseased populations 1`/! (red): while the increase of the fear transmissibility 
parameter IC brings to a constant the fraction of the diseased populations it also causes an initial 
decrease of resilience to a minimum value after which the system bounces back to optimal 
conditions. (C) Even in this case the minimum values of resilience (blue points) correspond to the 
transition region from high to low final diseased populations. The colormap of the logarithmic of 
the healthy populations (ghi(1 − 1`/!	)) is shown as a function of the local epidemic threshold F5 and the fear parameter IC. 
 
Effects of self-initiated behavioural changes. In order to isolate the effects of behavioural 
changes, in this section the travel parameter is kept constant with ? = 1. Individuals in the BC 
compartment adopt travel avoidance so that IC plays a similar role to the travel restriction as 
reported in Figure 3.  Furthermore, inside each subpopulation, individuals in the BC compartment 
reduce their contacts, thus decreasing the likelihood to become infected. Overall, the presence of 
self-initiated behavioral changes in a population results in a reduction of the final epidemic size. In 
this setting, we have explored a phase space of parameters constituted of F5 ∈ [1.01,3] and IC ∈
[0,20] (see the Methods section for the other model parameters). In Figure 3A we quantify 
resilience for different values of the fear parameter IC in heterogeneous metapopulation systems. 
The 3D dimensional plot in the IC, F5, @ space shows a clear similarity with the travel restrictions 
scenario. Figure 3B shows that, while increasing IC leads to a decrease in risk, it also induces a 
reduction of resilience. It is possible to observe that, even in this case, the minimum values of @ are 
related to the invasion threshold. In Figure 3C the phase diagram of the fraction of diseased 
populations at the end of the simulations 1`/! is reported in the IC, F5 space. This picture shows 
that there is a critical value of the fear transmissibility parameter IC, after which the fraction of 
diseased populations 1`/! starts to decrease (i.e. 1`/! < 1). The minimum value of resilience, 
in this case, corresponds to the value of the fear transmissibility, after which a reduction of the 
fraction of diseased populations is observed. Although the approach to this critical boundary 
corresponds to a reduction of the infection risk, similarly to the case of travel restrictions, the 
measured resilience of the system decreases and attains its minimum value right at the transition 
point.  
Effects of system-wide travel restrictions in data-driven simulations. As a further confirmation 
of the validity of the theoretical construct above described, we tested our results in a data-driven 
modelling setting. We considered the Global Epidemic and Mobility model (GLEAM) 3,49 which 
integrates high resolution demographic and mobility data by using a high-definition, geographically 
structured metapopulation approach. The model's technical details and the algorithms underpinning 
the computational implementation have been extensively reported in the literature. GLEAM is a 
spatial, stochastic and individual-based epidemic model that divides the world population into 
geographic census areas, defined around transportation hubs and connected by mobility fluxes. The 
population of each census area is obtained by integrating data from the high-resolution population 
database of the ‘Gridded Population of the World’ project of the Socioeconomic Data and 
Application Center at Columbia University (SEDAC).  
 Figure 4. Resilience and epidemic size in the data-driven scenario. (A) The plot shows the 
difference between resilience (blue) and the final fraction of diseased populations (red) for different 
values of the diffusion rate ?. Here, we can identify three critical regions of the system. i) diffusion 
rate ? = 0.1 above the critical invasion threshold. Even if the system is characterized by sub-
optimal resilience, the disease spreads all over the system. ii) the reduction of the diffusion 
parameter ? results in a significant decrease of the number of diseased populations but also in a 
dramatic decrease of resilience; iii) below the critical invasion threshold resilience goes back to 
high values as fraction of diseased populations approaches zero. (B) Epidemic size (red) and 
resilience (blue) for the different values of the diffusion parameter ? corresponding to the three 
aforementioned regions. Python 2.7 (https://www.python.org/) and the Basemap library 
(https://pypi.python.org/pypi/basemap/1.0.7) were used to create these maps. 
 
The mobility among subpopulations is comprised of global air travel and the small-scale movement 
between adjacent subpopulations; i.e., the daily commuting patterns of individuals. Commuting and 
short-range mobility considers data from 80,000 administrative regions in 5 different continents. 
Here, we considered the Continental United States and simulated an SEIR contagion process, in 
which infected individuals do not travel. The number of infected subpopulations at the end of an 
outbreak and resilience as a function of the global mobility restrictions that result are shown in 
Figure 4. The initial conditions of the epidemic were set with 5 infected individuals in the city of 
New York, assuming I = 0.48, G = 0.66 and H = 0.45. Mobility restrictions are implemented by 
reducing all the mobility flows connecting diseased subpopulations by a factor ?, thus considering 
the heterogeneities of the subpopulations due to their different local mobility patterns (see SI). The 
control time 4W  used in the calculation of @ corresponds to the epidemic extinction time for the 
different values of the diffusion rate. 
As with the theory-driven model here we observe that a reduction of the travel diffusion ? brings a 
constant reduction of diseased populations, but also reduces resilience until a critical value ?A 	=	1.2 ⋅ 10am. In Figure 4B we illustrate the geographical spreading of the contagion process and the 
reduction of traveling of each subpopulation tracked by the model in the Continental USA for values 
of ? corresponding to three different regions of the diagram of Figure 4A. The figure clearly 
illustrates three regimes: i) for low travel reduction, a very severe epidemic hits all the 
subpopulations, but the short duration allows the system to go back to normal in a short time (high 
values of resilience); ii) for travel reduction close to the global invasion threshold, a small number 
of subpopulations are hit but the system critical functionality is compromised for a very long time, 
thus, resulting in a low values of resilience; iii) travel reduction above the critical threshold allows 
the system to contain the epidemic at the origin with low risk and high values of resilience. It is 
worth remarking that in the data-driven model, the minimum value of resilience is reached for travel 
restrictions that correspond to a reduction of mobility of three to four orders of magnitude. This is 
because in modern transportation networks the global invasion threshold, as already pointed out in 
other studies 10,14,20,39, is reached only for very severe travel restrictions that are virtually impossible 
to achieve. In other words, in realistic settings the feasible increase of travel restrictions appears 
always to decrease resilience. This calls for a careful scrutiny of the trade-off between individual's 
risk and resilience, as the region where both are achieved is virtually not accessible. 
Discussion  
The realistic threat quantification is difficult and evaluation of vulnerabilities and consequences of 
new disease epidemics is certainly a challenge. We analyzed the impact of an infectious disease 
epidemic in structured populations by considering a definition of system resilience that takes into 
consideration not only the number of infected individuals but also society’s need for maintaining 
certain critical functions in space and time37. In particular, we assume that the limitations and 
disruptions of human mobility deteriorate the system's functionality. We observe that containment 
measures, that limit individuals' mobility, are advantageous in reducing risk but may deteriorate the 
system’s functionality for a very long time and thus correspond to low resilience. Although we have 
considered only two of the many dimensions encompassing the functionality of socio-technical 
systems 28,30, we show that study of resilience allows stakeholders to measure the impact of 
epidemic threats and differentiate between different management alternatives. It is straightforward 
to envision more realistic definition of the critical functionality. The components of critical 
functionality could be weighted according to objective/subjective evaluation of their relevance to 
stakeholders. Finally, cost-benefit analyses and ethical considerations should be included in the 
analysis of the societal impacts of disease that could lead to long lasting effects or even death of the 
affected individuals. This study highlights the importance of resilience-focused analysis for 
selecting intervention strategies. The natural tendency to be conservative in managing potentially 
inflated risks associated with new and emerging epidemics can result in unnecessary burdensome 
and possibly ineffective actions like quarantines as well as travel bans50. The emerging field of 
resilience assessment and management29 and its implementation32,34,35 could thus evaluate cross-
domain alternatives to identify a policy design that enhances the system's ability to (i) plan for such 
adverse events, (ii) absorb stress, (iii) recover, and (iv) predict and prepare for future stressors 
through necessary adaptation. To this end, the framework we presented can be of potential use for 
optimizing the policy response to a disease outbreak by balancing risk reduction with the disruption 
to critical functions that is associated with public health interventions. 
Methods 
Disease propagation and self-initiated behavioral changes. The metapopulation system is 
described by a scale-free network (SF) with a power-law degree distribution n(%) ∼ 	%(-q), which 
is generated by the configuration model51 with the minimum degree r	 = 	2, s	 = 	2.1. (For the 
travel restriction scenario, in the SI, we report a comparison of the results between the 
heterogeneous networked system described above and a metapopulation system formed by a 
random network with Poisson degree distribution, which is generated by the Erdos–Rényi (ER) 
model52) . The networks have ! = 5000 nodes and average degree 〈%〉 ∼ 6, while the total number 
of individuals is # = !t = 25 ⋅ 10u which are distributed among the subpopulations nodes 
proportional to their degree distribution. At the beginning, 10 populations are selected at random 
and 50 individuals are set as exposed. All other individuals across the system are initially 
susceptible. We study a compartmental scheme that extends the basic SEIR40 model by considering 
separate behavioral classes within populations (see SI for the detailed description of the model). 
For this reason, we assume that individuals can spontaneously change their behavior because of the 
fear of the disease entering in a specific compartment BC of susceptible individuals. In the case of 
travel restrictions, we set the transition rate from exposed to infected G	 = 	0.67	7wxy-f and 
recovery rate H = 0.33	7wxy-f . In the case of the behavioral model, we set the disease parameters G = 0.3	7wxy-f and H = 0.1	7wxy-f	while we consider an infection probability reduction @K =0.15, the self-reinforcement parameter J = 0	.1 and the relaxation parameter HC = 0.5. All the 
presented results are averaged over 100 simulations.  
Mobility process. We adopt a simplified mechanistic approach that uses a Markovian assumption 
for modeling migration among subpopulations; at each time step, the movement of individuals is 
given according to a matrix 7$( that expresses the probability that an individual in the subpopulation " is traveling to the subpopulation ). We assume that the diffusion rate on any given edge from a 
subpopulation node of degree %$ to a subpopulation node of degree %( is proportional to %( 39 and it 
is given by 7$( 	= z5	 %$%( {/4$, where 4$ = |$(( = z5( %$%( { represents the total flow in ", while } and the exponent z5 are system specific (e.g., and } = 0.5 and in the world-wide air 
transportation network 53). In this scenario, we consider } = 0.5 and z5 = 10a~. 
Global invasion threshold. For the SEIR model it is possible to explicitly calculate the average 
number of infected subpopulations for each infected subpopulation in a fully susceptible 
metapopulation system as F∗ = 	#? t Äaf ÅÇÉÑ ÄÅ 	9Å a 	9	 		9	 Å  3 where # represents the average number of 
individuals in a subpopulation. The condition F∗ = 1 defines the invasion threshold for the system. 
Only for F∗ > 1 can the epidemic spread to a large number of subpopulations. The invasion 
threshold readily provides an explicit condition for the critical mobility ?A, below which an 
epidemic cannot invade the metapopulation system, yielding the equation ?A =fÖ	 	9	 Å〈	9Å	〉	a〈	9	〉 	 ÇÉÑ ÄÅt Äaf Å 39. 
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Reaction process
The SEIR model [1] is customarily used to describe the progression of acute infectious diseases, such as influenza in closed
populations, where the total number of individuals in the population is partitioned into the compartments S(t), E(t), I(t) and
R(t), denoting the number of susceptible, exposed, infected and recovered individuals at time t, respectively. By definition it
follows that N(t) = S(t) + E(t) + I(t) +R(t). In the SEIR model we have three transitions:
S + I —≠æ E + I
E
⁄≠æ I [1]
I
µ≠æ R
The first one, denoted by S æ E, is when a susceptible individual interacts with an infectious individual and enters in the
exposed state with probability —. After a time period (the so-called intrinsic incubation time) ti = 1/⁄ the exposed individual
becomes infected. An infected individual recovers from the disease in the viremic time te = 1/µ. The crucial parameter in the
analysis of single population epidemic outbreaks is the basic reproductive number R0, which counts the expected number of
secondary infected cases generated by a primary infected individual, given by R0 = —/µ. Here we propose a characterization of
a set of prototypical mechanisms for self-initiated social distancing induced by local prevalence-based information available to
individuals in the population. We characterize the e ects of these mechanisms in the framework of a compartmental scheme
that enlarges the basic SEIR model by considering separate behavioral classes within the population (2). In particular the fear
of the disease is what induces behavioral changes in the population (3). For this reason we will assume that individuals a ected
by the fear of the disease will be grouped in a specific compartment SF of susceptible individuals. We consider a mechanism for
which people can acquire fear assuming that susceptible individuals will adopt behavioral changes only if they interact with
infectious individuals in the same subpopulations. This implies that the larger the number of sick and infectious individuals
among one populations, the higher the probability for the individuals that resides in that nodes to adopt behavioral changes
induced by awareness/fear of the disease. Moreover we consider the scenario in which we also consider self-reinforcing fear
spread which accounts for the possibility that individuals might enter the compartment simply by interacting with people
in this compartment: fear generating fear. In this model people could develop fear of the infection both by interacting with
infected persons and with people already concerned about the disease. A new parameter – Ø 0, is necessary to distinguish
between these two interactions. We assume that these processes, di erent in their nature, have di erent rates. To di erentiate
them we consider that people who contact infected people are more likely to be scared of the disease than those who interact
with fearful individuals. For this reason we set 0 Æ – Æ 1 . The fear contagion process therefore can be modeled as:
S + I —F≠≠æ SF + I [2]
where in analogy with the disease spread, —F is the transmission rate of the awareness/fear of the disease. In addition to
the local prevalence-based spread of the fear of the disease, in this case we assume that the fear contagion may also occur
by contacting individuals who have already acquired fear/awareness of the disease. In other words, the larger the number
of individuals who have fear/awareness of the disease among one individual’s contacts, the higher the probability of that
individual adopting behavioral changes and moving into the class SF . The fear contagion therefore can also progress according
to the following process:
S + SF
–—F≠≠≠æ 2SF [3]
Then we consider the fact that people with fear have less probability to become infected:
SF + I rb—≠≠æ E + I [4]
1–7
with 0 Æ rb < 1(i.e. rb— < —). Moreover we consider the fact that our social behavior is modified by our local interactions with
other individuals on a much more rapidly acting time-scale. The fear/awareness contagion process is not only defined by the
spreading of fear from individual to individual, but also by the process defining the transition from the state of fear of the
disease back to the regular susceptible state in which the individual relaxes the adopted behavioral changes and returns to
regular social behavior. We can therefore consider the following processes:
SF + S
µF≠≠æ 2S [5]
and
SF +R
µF≠≠æ S +R [6]
Finally the system can be described by the following set of equations:
dtS(t) = ≠—S(t)I(t)
N
≠ —FS(t)
5
I(t) + –SF (t)
N
6
+ µFS(t)
5
S(t) +R(t)
N
6
dtS
F (t) = ≠rb—SF (t)I(t)
N
+ —FS(t)
5
I(t) + –SF (t)
N
6
≠ µFS(t)
5
S(t) +R(t)
N
6
dtE(t) = ≠⁄E(t) + —S(t)I(t)
N
+ rb—SF
I(t)
N
[7]
dtI(t) = ≠µI(t) + ⁄E(t)
dtR(t) = µI(t)
The system described by the Equation 7 is reduced to classic SEIR for —F = 0.
Definition of the control time TC
We set the control time TC as function of the epidemic extinction time TE for the di erent model parameters we considered.
The control time TC corresponds to the maximum extinction time TE for di erent values of epidemic reproductive number R0
an be defined.
Fig. S1 shows the epidemic extinction time decreasing the di usion parameter p for three di erent values of the epidemic
reproduction number R0. Fig. S1 shows the value of the control time TC(R0) used in our experiments in both homogeneous
and heterogeneous networks in the di usion case.
Critical Thresholds
For the SEIR model identify model a critical mobility value pc, below which the epidemics cannot invade the metapopulation
system given by the equation [2]:
pc =
1
Nˆ
ÈkÍ2
Èk2Í ≠ ÈkÍ
(µ+ ⁄)R20
2(R0 ≠ 1)2 [8]
where Nˆ represents the average number of individuals in a population. In Fig. S3 we report the minimum valued of the resilience
(points) and the theoretical values of the invasion threshold (dotted lines) in both homogenous and heterogeneous networks.
The e ect of the heterogeneity on the invasion threshold in metapopulation has been previously extensively analysed [3]. In
Fig. S3,Fig. S4, Fig. S5 we report the comparison between homogeneous and heterogeneous cases. Here we consider ⁄ = 0.3
and µ = 0.1.
Self-initiated behavioral changes
Even in this scenario we observed the presence of a critical value of the precaution level —F after which there is the reduction
of the risk in the system (see Figure 3 in the main text). In correspondence of this critical point it is possible to observe
non trivial patterns of the system’s functionality [4–14]. Indeed the behavioral changes though complicates the dynamics
of the model [15]: in particular, within several regions of the parameter space we observe two or more epidemic peaks that
produce non-trivial patterns of the system’s critical functionality as shown in Fig. S6. This non-trivial behavior can be easily
understood. Behavioral change is a self-reinforcing mechanism until it causes a decline in new cases. At this point individuals
are lured into a false sense of security and return back to their normal behavior often causing a multiple epidemic peaks as
reported in Fig. S7. Some authors believe that a similar process occurred during the 1918 pandemic, resulting in multiple
epidemic peaks [16, 17]. In this following example it is possible to observe that before the critical (—F = 4.3) point even if all
the populations are interested by the disease the extinction time of the disease itself it is lower if compared with the extinction
time caused by the multiple peaks caused by the increasing of the precaution level (—F = 4.3). However after the transition
point the system starts to recover fast also reducing the risk.
The authors contributed to (A) conceive and design the experiments, (B) perform the experiments, (C) write the paper, (D) develop the model, (E) perform the data driven simulations and (F) analyse the
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Data-driven simulations: GLEAM
In order to validate the theoretical framework developed, we considered data-driven simulations using the Global Epidemic
And Mobility Model (GLEAM) [18]. GLEAM is based on three di erent data layers (see Ref. [18] for details). In particular,
• The population layer is based on the high-resolution population database of the Gridded Population of the World project
by the Socio-Economic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC) that estimates population with a granularity given by a
lattice of cells covering the whole planet at a resolution of 15x15 minutes of arc.
• Mobility Layer integrates short-range and long-range transportation data. Long-range air travel mobility is based on
travel flow data obtained from the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and the O cial Airline Guide (OAG)
databases, which contain the list of worldwide airport pairs connected by direct flights and the number of available
seats on any given connection. The combination of the population and mobility layers allows for the subdivision of
the world into geo-referenced census areas obtained by a Voronoi tessellation procedure around transportation hubs.
These census areas define the subpopulations of the metapopulation modeling structure, identifying 3,362 subpopulations
centered on IATA airports in 220 di erent countries. The model simulates the mobility of individuals between these
subpopulations using a stochastic procedure defined by the airline transportation data. Short-range mobility considers
commuting patterns between adjacent subpopulations based on data collected and analyzed from more than 30 countries
in 5 continents across the world. It is modeled with a time-scale separation approach that defines the e ective force of
infections in connected subpopulations (see Ref. [18] for details). In other words, short-range mobility is considered at
equilibrium in the time scale of long-range patterns. Here, we restricted our analysis to the continental US. To this end,
we considered both long and short range mobility patterns limited to the continental US.
• Epidemic Layer defines the disease and population dynamics. The infection dynamics takes place within each subpopulation
and assumes a compartmentalization that can be defined according to the infectious disease under study and the
intervention measures being considered. As done for the other simulations we considered a SEIR model.
We applied the travel restrictions by multiplying the mobility flows by p. However, considering that by construction short-range
mobility is encoded in the e ective force of infection (in other words in the simulations individuals do not “move” due to
short-mobility) we estimate the value of A(t) as:
A(t) = p
ÿ
i
[Ni(t)≠ Ii(t)]
Ni(t)
[9]
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Fig. S1. Control time definition. Median value of the epidemic extinction time Te as function of the diffusion rate p. The maximum time correspond to the epidemic control time
TC(R0).
Fig. S2. Different values of the control time in both homogeneous and heterogeneous networks for different values of the epidemic reproduction number R0.
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Fig. S3. Effect of the network heterogeneity on the system’s risk and resilience. The minimum value of the resilience (dots), which corresponds to the theoretical value of
the final fraction of diseased subpopulations DŒ/V at the end of the global epidemic (dotted lines), is shown as a function of the mobility rate p in a homogeneous and
heterogeneous networks. The minimum value of the resilience separates the two region of high resilience.
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Fig. S4. Resilience surface in homogeneous networks in the plane (p≠ R0). Figure B refers to R0 = 1.3.
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Fig. S5. Resilience surface in heterogeneous networks in the plane (p≠ R0). Figure B refers to R0 = 1.3.
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Fig. S6. (log-log) Average values of the system’s critical functionality for R0 = 2 before (dotted line), over (red line) and after the transition point.
Fig. S7. (log-x) Average values of the diseased populations for R0 = 2 before (dotted line), over (red line) and after the transition point.
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